Introduction
Political scientist Lindsey O’Rourke, in his 2018 book, Covert Regime Change: America’s Secret Cold War, argued that civil society organizations (CSOs)/ non-government organizations (NGOs) in many countries in the Global South have been used to effect regime change. Economist Jeffrey Sachs’ recent statement at the UN Security Council following the US capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, endorsed O’Rourke’s account. Roger Harris and John Perry documented the use of NGOs by the US to instigate regime change in Latin America.
James Petras is an early account of the link between imperialism and NGOs. According to Petras, by the 1990s NGOs were receiving close to $4 billion dollars world-wide from Western sources and were directly involved in competing with socio-political movements for the allegiance of local leaders and activist communities.
It is widely perceived in Bangladesh that many CSOs, dependent on donor funding, and their leadership were part of the 1/11 regime change. The rise of the authoritarian regime in Bangladesh was a part of the 1/11 plan, as it opened a large-scale opportunity for the political regime to blanket capture all national institutions and policies. The plan’s underlying intention was to subdue the country and crush its indomitable spirit.
This piece primarily seeks to highlight the challenges posed by Western resource-dependent CSOs in Bangladesh and argues for an organic approach to the CSO movement. This piece is developed primarily from the authors’ observations over three decades, along with professional insights and academic readings. Without any intention of ignoring CSOs contributions to consolidating democracy and promoting people’s rights and voices, it deliberately argues that we need our own way of developing CSOs, as Western-value-laden CSOs have done more harm. The analysis focuses on the country’s socio-political aspects.
The genesis of CSOs in Bangladesh
Civil society organizations (CSOs) play an important role in Bangladeshi society. From a definitional perspective, civil society is a non-political entity that aims to advance the interests of various professional and occupational groups (such as trade unions, teachers’ guilds, journalists’ associations, lawyers’ forums, and even research entities focused on public policy, governance, and development). CSOs, in their current forms and roles, have distinct histories, rooted in global political developments in the 1970s and 1980s. CSOs now play larger roles; they influence both national and international public policies and development agendas, and thus have become formal actors in development and governance.
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 prompted the West to export democracy and human rights (read their version) across the Global South, characterized by Samuel Huntington as democracy’s third wave. At the same time, the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union left the socialist sympathizers in developing countries in an ideological vacuum, thus making them susciptable to being co-opted in the West’s democratization project. As Francis Fukuyama quickly declared “The End of History”, meaning the end-point of humanity’s ideological evolution and the triumph of liberal democracy, many socialist sympathizers of the Global South seemed convinced, especially seeing anti-communist protests sweeping across the former Soviet Union and East European Socialist countries.
In the case of Bangladesh, the global shift coincided with the fall of the military dictator General Ershad in 1990, a year before the USSR crumbled, creating an environment of hope and enthusiasm for democracy. Thus, many former socialists in Bangladesh preferred partnering with Western International Non-Government Organizations (INGOs), aid agencies, or even governments to establish CSO platforms in Bangladesh. At the initial stage, a few research and policy advocacy platforms emerged within civil society; later, various organizations with specific agendas, such as gender, environment, labour rights, and mass education, formed a large alliance of civil society in Bangladesh. Collectively, they adopted two strategies- research and advocacy- to advance their agendas.
The country witnessed a new wave of growth in CSOs since the 1990s. The caretaker government of 1990, for the first time, accepted several individuals, otherwise known as CSO representatives, as advisors (ministers), and CSOs became a formal part of the ruling elites, marking new dynamics in the political spectrum.
CSOs’ counterproductive contributions
Since its independence, Bangladesh has experienced confrontational, polarized politics, resulting in low trust and greater hatred in the political environment. One of the two competing political groups preferred to be characterized as secular and the promoter of Bengali nationalism; this group is also considered to be ideologically hostile to the sympathizers and practitioners of Islam, the largest religion in Bangladesh.
Although the hostility does not manifest at the formal or policy level, those who carefully observe the nuances of political development can easily understand its uneasiness and bitter practices on the ground. The selection and posting in public administration are key yardsticks for gauging such discriminatory practices. Hardly any religiously practicing Muslim officials could rise to senior positions during the secularist regime. The experiences from 2009 to 2024 strongly vindicate this claim.
Because of past relations and sympathies toward socialism and secularism, major CSO leaders opted to support the country’s secular political forces, revealing their subtle and deliberate biases against sympathizers and practitioners of nationalist and religious values. Interestingly while some left-leaning CSOs are vocal on national issues, their socialist inclination makes them internationists by definition on the issues of international relations. They tend to equate the interest of country with the interest of the country from which they draw ideological inspirations.
Therefore, Bangladesh’s CSOs are, to a large extent, necessarily partisan and promoters of particular political agendas and cultural values. With such a political posture, they also became a key contributor to the ongoing political cleavages. Instead of finding a common path, they developed narratives that undermined the political rights of the other camp. The last kleptocratic and authoritarian regime (2009-2024) drew much strength and legitimacy from this type of CSOs and their promoters.
Among CSOs, many are advocates of human rights and civil liberties. Still, due to their political hatred against the religion-inspired political elements, they tacitly supported the authoritarian regime, and its subservience to India. They overlooked the massive human rights violations (such as abduction and enforced disappearances) and rampant resource plundering, particularly bank looting.
Because of the nature of the genesis, these CSOs have become a valuable instrument for Western donors and countries to advance their political, social, and cultural agendas in Bangladesh. Given the overwhelming cultural difference between the West and a Muslim-majority country, the CSO agendas often clash with the local social norms and values. They do not even hesitate to portray the country as “fundamentalist” to appease their Western audiences without much credible evidence. All these they do to garner resources from the West.
Sometimes, they use purposeful research findings to create a climate of tension in society, often leading to the rise of Islamophobic politics. The “secularist” elite class has also created a narrative of the so-called political economy of fundamentalism. In the name of chocking the economy of fundamentalism, some extreme securalists provided a pretext for the kleptocratic regime’s capture of the largest and most successful bank of the country, the Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited (IBBL) while they remained silent when IBBL and other captured Islami banks were looted.
However, the most significant aspects of CSOs’ dependence on Western donors and countries go beyond these. Not only have they been the Western proxies, but they have also become culturally colonized. As ardent believers in modernization theory, they tend to undermine local values, indigenous practices, and knowledge.
In some cases, they adopt political and strategic positions that enhance the objectives and goals of their protectors and resource providers. The International CHT Commission is a good example in this regard, seeking to undermine national strategic leverage and physical integrity. This brand of CSOs also undermines the national policy ecosystem, seeking to constrain the country’s policy autonomy and capacity. With enormous resources at their disposal, they offer consultancy and research opportunities to expand their alliance and network.
In the past four decades, many intellectuals in the country have lost their critical scholarship due to consultancies offered by CSOs and their hosts, both within and beyond the country. This patronage culture lured intellectuals to advance agendas that are not crucial to us but to donors. The collaboration between donors, local intellectuals (read consultants), and CSOs has helped the donor community establish control over the national policy and planning process, resulting in irreparable damage.
The bureaucracy has also failed to withstand the formidable challenges created by this group. Many insiders within Bangladesh’s public administration have identified that CSOs that tilt towards the West do not want a professional and effective civil service system, because they think that if an effective bureaucracy emerges, their influence will be blighted.
It is interesting to note that Western largesse-dependent CSOs often advocate for democracy and transparency, yet their leadership is widely criticized for monopolizing their own institutions. Several major CSOs have not experienced any leadership change over the last couple of decades. Many CSOs would rather have seen group and/or individual control, and very low transparency and accountability. The reason is simple: it includes high salaries and other material opportunities. Additionally, most of Bangladesh’s CSOs prefer to align with the West-dominated global power circuit and its agents. Because of the resources, the principal-agent theory is working at its best.
While the co-option in the 1990 caretaker government marked the beginning of CSOs’ emergence as power brokers, it has not stopped there. All extraordinary political regimes after 1990, the caretaker governments of 1996, 2001, the 1/11 government, and the interim government of 2024 have been handled by them. They have become conduits between donors, business elites, politicians, and other societal elites. Because of their overwhelming influence over the policy regime, they have also been able to partner with the business elites. Many business groups/associations utilize them to influence and capture national policies, primarily economic in nature.
Why is a new pathway for promoting an organic approach to CSO imperative
Precisely, our four decades of experience suggests that the Western handout-dependent CSOs, in the guise of promoters of the people’s agenda, have themselves become partners with many powerful actors, donors, business elites, and politicians to protect their own influence in society. Consequently, this experience prompts us to rethink the limitations of the current approach to CSOs development and explore new opportunities to promote and strengthen the indigenous approach to CSOs.
An indigenous approach means that CSOs should be homegrown, rely on local resources, and be independent of international funding and influence to promote national or local interests, in particular of the socio-economically disadvtaged population. The organic culture would encourage CSOs to be more interested in partnering with government actors, community people, and other professional groups to advance national interest and policy autonomy.
Bangladesh’s governance performance is not encouraging. Over the last five decades, the ruling regimes have extracted and siphoned off national resources to satisfy their own greed. In doing so, they spoiled all good practices and undermined institutional effectiveness. In such a context, Bangladesh needs vigilant, independent civil society organizations to advance people’s priorities and hold the political regime to account.
The current CSOs and their leadership cannot meet these aspirations as they are already intertwined with Western and regional geo-strategic objectives and business motives. Bangladesh’s patriotic intellectual community should launch a new movement to build organic CSOs. The youth envisaged a new Bangladesh in the lead-up to the July Revolution; all non-state actors, including CSOs, must uphold the spirit and help promote good governance, fairness, and empathy in society. In achieving this coveted objective, there is no alternative to launching a new movement to promote organic and indigenous CSOs.
Mohammad Mizanur Rahman
Dr. Mohammad Mizanur Rahman is an Associate Researcher (Non-resident), University of Antwerp, and author and editor of three books published by Routledge and Springer
